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essarily complicated procedure.73
In the 25 calendar years from 1944 through 1968, only 89 government
civil antitrust cases were heard by the Supreme Court and of these, 30 re-

ceived per curiam opinions. 74 Therefore, criticism that the Expediting Act

imposes a tremendous burden on the Court is somewhat unfounded. It is
true, however, that this appeal of right does require the Supreme Court to frequently review cases of little significance 75 and precludes a litigant's right to
a full review of the trial court's decision in an intermediate appellate court.
"Antitrust laws . . . are the Magna Charta [sic] of free enterprise" 76 and

remedial legislation must insure that federal appellate procedure effetively
aids in the determination of economic issues arising under such laws. The
Expediting Act is an anachronism that works contrary to its purpose.
Donald C. McCleary

TAXATION-FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS-THE TEXAS LEGISLATURE HAS
No AUTHORITY To EXEMPT FROM AD VALOREM TAXATION A FRATERNAL ORGANIZATION'S PROPERTY WHICH Is BEING USED FOR NONCHARITABLE ACTIVITIES, UNLESS SUCH USE IS IN Furtherance OF A

CHARITABLE PURPOSE. City of Amarillo v. Amarillo Lodge No. 731,
488 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. Sup. 1972).
The City of Amarillo and three Amarillo taxing units filed suit against
Amarillo Lodge No. 731, Ancient Free and Accepted Masons, and three other
lodges, to collect delinquent ad valorem taxes assessed on three lots located
ments or interlocutory orders be taken to the courts of appeals except where the
Attorney General states "that such direct appeal is necessary for . . .effective administration . . . [or where the defendant declares] that such a direct appeal is necessary
in the interest of justice." S. 2808, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Representative
Celler proposed to amend § 1 of the Expediting Act by providing the chief judge of
the court of appeals with authority to reassign a case to a single judge district court
which had been assigned to the three-judge district court by the Attorney General.
H.R. 6451, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
73. Representative Toll proposed that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court appoint a national panel of antitrust judges to be selected from the mass of federal district judges. When a government antitrust suit was initiated, the district court or the
Attorney General could certify that the particular case was of great importance. The
chief judge of the court of appeals would then choose an antitrust judge from the
national panel to rule on the case. H.R. 6766, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
74. Kirkpatrick, Antitrust to the Supreme Court: The Expediting Act, 37 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 746, 762 (1969).
75. Solomon, Repeal of the Expediting Act-A Negative View, 1961 N.Y.S.B.A.
ANTITRUST LAw SYMPosIuM 94, 96.
76. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., -

U.S.

-,

-,

92 S. Ct. 1126, 1135,

31 L.Ed.2d 515, 527 (1972).
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in that city. This property and the building erected thereon are owned
jointly, although not equally, by the lodges. The building is used by each of
the defendants to conduct lodge meetings, initiations and ceremonies incidental to the practice of Masonry. Each lodge is chartered by and subordinate to a grand lodge which is incorporated under the laws of Texas,' and
the purposes for which each was organized are substantially the same. 2 All
of the defendants contribute a certain percentage of the money they receive
from dues and initiation fees to their respective grand lodges,8 and the grand
4
lodges use these funds to operate or support various charitable enterprises.
The remainder of the money received by the defendant lodges is used to pay
for the operating and maintenance expenses of the premises, with any balance being devoted to various charitable and educational endeavors as the
defendant lodges deem proper.
The plaintiffs (taxing units) argued that the utilization of the property for
meetings, initiations and ceremonies incidental to the practice of Masonry
was not a charitable use, thus the defendants were not entitled to exemption from ad valorem taxes under sections 7 and 22 of article 7150. 5 The
I. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 1399, 1400 (1962). Art. 1399:
The Grand Lodge of Texas, Ancient, Free and Accepted Masons, the Grand

Royal Arch Chapter of Texas, the Grand Commandery of Knights Templars of
Texas (Masonic); the grand lodge of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows of
Texas, and other like institutions and orders, organized for charitable or benevolent purposes may, by the consent of their respective bodies expressed by a resolution or otherwise, become bodies corporate under this title.
Art. 1400:
The incorporation of any such grand body shall include all of its subordinate
lodges, or bodies holding warrant or charter under such grand body, and each of
such subordinate bodies shall have all the rights of other corporations under and
by the name given it in such warrant or charter issued by the grand body to
which it is attached, such rights being provided for in the charter of the grand
body.
2. Corporate Charters of the Grand Lodge (1900); Charter of the Grand Royal
Arch Chapter of Texas (1900); Charter of the Grand Council of Royal and Select
Masters of Texas (1953); Charter of the Grand Commandery Knights Templar of
Texas (1924). The Corporate Charters of the Grand Lodge (1900) provides:
The said Grand Lodge and this corporation is formed for charitable and benevolent purposes, and to cement bonds of good fellowship and brotherly love
among its members and adherents, and to practice the art of Ancient Free and
Accepted Masonry as has been done from time immemorial.
All subordinate Lodges of Masons in Texas now working under and holding
charter from and by said The Grand Lodge of Texas, or that may hereafter be
instituted under such charter, are hereby incorporated, and do by virtue hereof become bodies corporate under and in the name given them respectively in the
charters heretofore issued to them, or that may hereafter be so issued.
3. "These proportions range from 12 to 40 per cent in the case of initiation fees
and from 34 to 43 per cent in the case of dues ......
City of Amarillo v. Amarillo
Lodge No. 731, 488 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Tex. Sup. 1972). It should further be noted that
this money is the only income received by the lodges. Id. at 71.
4. These charitable activities were listed in Amarillo Lodge No. 731 v. City
of Amarillo, 473 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971), rev'd, 488 S.W.2d
69 (Tex. Sup. 1972).
5. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7150, §§ 7, 22 (Supp. 1972). Section 7 pro-
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trial court denied defendants' claim. In reversing that decision, the court of
civil appeals held that the use of the property for meetings, initiations and
ceremonies was merely an incidental use of the property and would not defeat the defendants' right to the tax exemption. 6 From this decision the
taxing units appealed. Held-Reversed. The legislature had no authority
to exempt from ad valorem taxation a fraternal organization's property
which is being used for noncharitable activities, unless such use is in furtherance of a charitable purpose. The use of the premises by the defendants
for meetings, initiations and ceremonies does not constitute a use in furtherance of a charitable purpose. Such use of the premises does not relieve the
community or the state of any burden or duty which they might otherwise
be obligated to assume. In addition, this use of the premises cannot be assumed to be an incidental use, and the defendants have failed to prove
that they come within the statutory provisions which will entitle them to the
7
tax exemption.
The authority of the Texas Legislature to exempt certain property from taxation is granted by Article VIII, Section 2, of the Texas Constitution. 8 Under
the provisions of section 2, the legislature is authorized to enact general
laws which exempt from taxation the property belonging to an "institution of
purely public charity." 9 Pursuant to this authority, article 715010 was enacted providing exemption of property belonging to institutions of purely
11 and for the property of fraternal organizations,
public charity (section 7),
vides for the tax exemptions of property belonging to institutions of purely public charity, while section 22 provides for the tax exemption of property belonging to fraternal
organizations, so long as it is used for charitable purposes.
6. Amarillo Lodge No. 731 v. City of Amarillo, 473 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1971), rev'd, 488 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. Sup. 1972).
7. City of Amarillo v. Amarillo Lodge NO. 731, 488 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. Sup. 1972).
Section 22 was enacted in 1967. Prior to this time, all cases dealing with tax exemption of property belonging to fraternal organizations were decided under the provisions
of section 7. Similar cases to the one in question, where lodge property was involved,
likewise denied the exemption. See Masonic Temple Ass'n v. Amarillo Ind. School
Dist., 14 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1928, writ ref'd). This case involved the same defendant lodges as in the present case. The court held that the
purpose of conducting lodge meetings, etc., rendered the use of the property only
partly charitable, thus the lodges were not entitled to tax exemption under secton 7.
See City of Houston v. Scottish Rite Benevolent Ass'n, 111 Tex. 191, 230 S.W. 978
(1921); Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, Lodge No. 151 v. City of Houston,
44 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1931, writ ref'd).
8. TEx. CONST. art. VIH, § 2:
[T~he legislature may, by general laws, exempt from taxation public property used
for public purposes . . . and institutions of purely public charity; and all laws
exempting property from taxation other than the property above mentioned shall
be null and void.
9. Id.
10. T-Ex. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7150 (Supp. 1972).
11. Id. § 7:
The following property shall be exempt from taxation, to-wit:
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so long as it is used for charitablepurposes (section 22).12
In an attempt to render justice among the state's citizens, 18 and because
tax exemptions are the "antithesis of equality and uniformity,"'1 4 Texas
courts have subjected all provisions exempting property from taxation to
rigid construction. 15 As early as 1918, this strict construction rule established that any claimed exemption was confined to the very terms of the
provision which granted it. 16
Through the application of these rules strictly construing the legislative
enactments, the burden has been placed upon the one seeking an exemption to bring himself clearly within the terms of the provision under which
an exemption is claimed.' 7 Further, should reasonable doubt arise as to
7. Public Charities. All buildings and personal property belonging to institutions of purely public charity, together with the lands belonging to and occupied
by such institutions . . .not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit, unless
such rents and profits and all moneys and credits are appropriated by such institutions solely to sustain such institutions and for the benefit of the sick and
disabled members and their families and the burial of the same, or for the maintenance of persons when unable to provide for themselves, whether such persons
are members of such institutions or not.
12. Id. § 22.
The following property shall be exempt from taxation, to-wit:
Sec. 22. The property of all fraternal organizations shall be exempt from
taxation for so long as the property is owned and used for charitable, benevolent,
religious, and educational purposes, and is not in whole or in part leased out to
others, or otherwise used with a view to profit.

13. See Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6, 68 Tex. 698, 702, 5 S.W. 519,

520 (1887): "[ilt is but just and equitable that the property of all persons and associations of persons should bear the burdens of government in equal proportion ....
Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, Lodge No. 151 v. City of Houston, 44
S.W.2d 488, 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1931, writ ref'd): "It is the policy of
the state, and but justice between its citizens, that all property should be taxed, and
that no property shall escape this common burden ....
14. Hilltop Village, Inc. v. Kerrville Ind. School Dist., 426 S.W.2d 943, 948 (Tex.
Sup. 1968) (dissenting opinion): "All of the courts appear to pay homage to the
rule that tax exemptions are subject to strict construction since they are the antithesis
of equality and uniformity." See 18 Sw. L.J. 703, 703 (1964).
15. Hilltop Village, Inc. v. Kerrville Ind. School Dist., 426 S.W.2d 943, 948 (Tex.
Sup. 1968); Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6, 68 Tex. 698, 702, 5 S.W. 519, 520
(1887); Challenge Homes, Inc. v. County of Lubbock, 474 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Raymondville Memorial Hosp. v. State,
253 S.W.2d 1012, 1014 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Markham Hosp. v. City of Longview, 191 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1945, writ ref'd); City of Wichita Falls v. Cooper, 170 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1943, writ ref'd); Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, Lodge
No. 151 v. City of Houston, 44 S.W.2d 488, 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1931,
writ ref'd); Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of San Antonio, 201 S.W.
669, 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1918, writ ref'd).
16. Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of San Antonio, 201 S.W. 669,
670 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1918, writ ref'd); accord, Most Worshipful Prince
Hall v. City of Fort Worth, 435 S.W.2d 274, 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968,
writ ref'd).
17. Stein v. Lewisville Ind. School Dist., 481 S.W.2d 436, 439 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Plantation Foods, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 437
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whether the claimant is entitled to the exemption, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the taxing units.' 8 By requiring the claimant to clearly
establish that he is entitled to the tax exemption, the courts have emphasized the fact that tax exemptions cannot be granted on the basis of inference or implication. 19 In the instant case, the Texas Supreme Court applied the above mentioned rules in determining whether the defendant
lodges were entitled to an exemption under the provisions of either sections
7 or 22 of article 7150.20
Section 7 both defines a "purely public charity" 2' and provides for the tax
exemption of property owned and used by an institution which comes within
that definition. 22 Decisions have been rendered holding that the institution
must be one of purely charity not only in the purpose for which it is
formed, but also in the means used to accomplish such purposes. 23 In
addition, the Texas courts have established certain "other" requirements
S.W.2d 396, 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Radio Bible Hour,
Inc. v. Hurst-Euless Ind. School Dist., 341 S.W.2d 467, 468 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Malone-Hogan Hosp. Clinic Foundation v. City of
Big Spring, 288 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, Lodge No. 151 v. City of Houston, 44 S.W.2d
488, 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1931, writ ref'd); Trinity Methodist Episcopal
Church v. City of San Antonio, 201 S.W. 669, 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1918, writ ref'd).
18. Santa Rosa Infirmary v. City of San Antonio, 259 S.W. 926, 931 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1924, jdgmt adopted); Malone-Hogan Hosp. Clinic Foundation v. City
of Big Spring, 288 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Markham Hosp. v. City of Longview, 191 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1945, writ ref'd); Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of San Antonio, 201 S.W. 669, 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1918, writ ref'd); City of
Dallas v. Cochran, 166 S.W. 32, 34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1914, writ ref'd).
19. Daughters of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 387 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Raymondville Memorial Hosp. v.
State, 253 S.W.2d 1012, 1014 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
20. City of Amarillo v. Amarillo Lodge NO. 731, 488 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. Sup.
1972); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7150, §§ 7, 22 (Supp. 1972).
21. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7150, § 7 (Supp. 1972):
An institution of purely public charity under this article is one which dispenses its
aid to its members and others in sickness or distress, or at death, without regard
to poverty or riches of the recipient, also when funds, property and assets of such
institutions are placed and bound by its law to relieve, aid and administer in any
way to the relief of its members when in want, sickness and distress, and provide
homes for its helpless and dependent members and to educate and maintain the
orphans of its deceased members or other persons ....
22. Id. § 7:
The following property shall be exempt from taxation, to-wit:
7. Public Charities. All buildings and personal property belonging to institutions of purely public charity, together with the lands belonging to and occupied
by such institutions . ...

23. Hilltop Village, Inc. v. Kerrville Ind. School Dist., 426 S.W.2d 943, 946
(Tex. Sup. 1968); City of Houston v. Scottish Rite Benevolent Ass'n, 111 Tex. 191, 198,
230 S.W. 978, 980 (1921); Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, Lodge No. 151
v. City of Houston, 44 S.W.2d 488, 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1931, writ ref'd).
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which must be met before an institution may qualify under the provisions of
section 7.
In our opinion, the Legislature might reasonably conclude that an institution was one of "purely public charity" where: First, it made no

gain or profit; second, it accomplished ends wholly benevolent; and,
third, it benefited persons, indefinite in numbers and in personalties

[sic] by preventing them, through absolute gratuity, from becoming

24
burdens to society and to the state.

Although the third requirement does not specifically mention the "use" of
the property, it has become one of the main criteria in determining whether
25
a charitable purpose has been accomplished.
By reasoning that the use of the property for lodge meetings, initiations
and ceremonies was not a use contemplated under the provisions of section
7, and that the lodges were not "purely public charities," it appears that the
lodges failed to qualify for the exemption under that section. As Justice
Walker pointed out, "Neither the community nor the state is under any duty
to provide or support lodge meetings, initiations and ceremonies for private
fraternal organizations. . . . [T]he activities in themselves do not lighten
any public burden."'2 6 It should be further noted that section 7 deals with

the tax exemption of property of "purely public charities," whereas section
22 deals solely with the tax exemption of property of fraternal organizations.
Since section 22 is the more specific statute, its provisions will govern in the
27
present situation, and section 7 is inapplicable.
Section 22 was enacted by the Texas Legislature in 1967, to provide specifically for the exemption of property belonging to "fraternal organiza-

tions."'2 8

Under this section, a "fraternal organization" is defined as "[a]

24. City of Houston v. Scottish Rite Benevolent Ass'n, 111 Tex. 191, 198, 230
S.W. 978, 981 (1921).
25. The importance of this requirement was pointed out by the court in the instant case when it stated: "[lit is essential that the organization assume, to a material extent, that which otherwise might become the obligation or duty of the
community or state." City of Amarillo v. Amarillo Lodge NO. 731, 488 S.W.2d 69,
71 (Tex. Sup. 1972); see San Antonio Conserv. Soc'y, Inc. v. City of San Antonio,
455 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex. Sup. 1970); River Oaks Garden Club v. City of Houston,
370 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Sup. 1963); Challenge Homes, Inc. v. County of Lubbock,
474 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
26. City of Amarillo v. Amarillo Lodge NO. 731, 488 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Tex. Sup.
1972).
27. Id. at 73. The court appears to have adopted this approach in determining
that section 7 was inapplicable. They point out that the legislature had no power to
exempt this property from taxation under the provisions of section 7 and that it was
unnecessary to consider this section in determining whether the property should
be exempt.
28. TEx. REv.COv. STAT. ANN. art. 7150, § 22 (Supp. 1972):
The following property shall be exempt from taxation, to-wit:
Sec. 22. The property of all fraternal organizations shall be exempt from taxation for so long as the property is owned and used for charitable, benevolent,
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lodge, or lodges, engaged in charitable, benevolent, religious, and educational work."'2 9 An exemption, to be allowed under section 22, must be
based upon the provision allowing for the exemption of a fraternal organi30
zation's property which is "owned and used for charitable. . . purposes.
Many court decisions initially reasoned that in order to constitute a use of
property for charitable purposes, the property must be wholly owned by the
claimant, and in addition, it must be used exclusively for the charitable purpose upon which the exemption is claimed. 3 1 An important extension has
evolved in later cases. The "use" need no longer be exclusively charitable,
so long as such noncharitable use is in furtherance of the charitable purpose
for which the exemption is allowed. 2 This is the proposition in Hilltop
Village, Inc. v. Kerrville Independent School District,3 3 in which the court

religious, and educational purposes, and is not in whole or in part leased out to
others, or otherwise used with a view to profit.
29. Id. § 22. Section 22 further states:
However, this Act shall not apply to any fraternal organization or lodge which
pays to its members, either directly or indirectly, any type of insurance benefit, be
it life, health, accident or death benefit, or any other type of insurance; neither
shall any organization which shall directly or indirectly participate or engage in
any political activity, either in support of or in opposition to any candidate seeking
any public office, have or be entitled to benefits as provided under this Act.
30. Under the facts stipulated in the case, it plainly appears that the only question for determination was whether or not a charitable purpose had been served by
the use of the property for conducting meetings, initiations and ceremonies incident to
the practice of Masonry. City of Amarillo v. Amarillo Lodge NO. 731, 488 S.W.2d 69,
70 (Tex. Sup. 1972). This case is the first to construe the provisions of section 22.
It should be noted at the outset that there is no constitutional provision specifically
authorizing the legislature to exempt property of "fraternal organizations;" therefore, if
an exemption is allowed, it not only depends on whether the claimed exemption
comes within the provisions of section 22, but also depends on whether or not section
22 is constitutional. See TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
31. Daughters of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 387 S.W.2d 709, 713
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.): "The claimed exempt charity
must be wholly such, it cannot be partially exempt. The property must be used
exclusively for charity, unmixed with any other purpose or object." Accord, Benevolent
& Protective Order of Elks, Lodge No. 151 v. City of Houston, 44 S.W.2d 488,
493 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1931, writ ref'd): "Therefore, for an institution to
be one of 'purely public charity,' it must be one whose property is used wholly and
exclusively for charitable purposes." Masonic Temple Ass'n v. Amarillo Ind. School
Dist., 14 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1928, writ ref'd): "The agreed
statement shows that the 'lodge work is only partly charitable and the lodges do other
work besides dispensing charity.' Therefore their activities include other fields than
charity, and to that extent the property is not used exclusively an an institution of
purely public charity."
32. Santa Rosa Infirmary v. City of San Antonio, 259 S.W. 926, 931 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1924, jdgmt adopted):
If this language is to be given effect, it seems the Legislature contemplated that
in aid and furtherance of their work charitable institutions might derive as an incident of the administration of their charities rents and profits where they were
devoted directly and solely to those very charities. [Emphasis added.]
This case represents the initial decision determining that a noncharitable activity would
still support the exemption, so long as it was used exclusively to further the charitable
activity.
33. 426 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Sup. 1968).
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stated that "the properties which are the subject of the claimed exemption
must be owned and used exclusively by the institution in furthering its
charitable activites." '34 Section 22 follows this later reasoning as it does not
demand that the property be used for charitable purposes exclusively.3 5
Incidental noncharitable uses of the property under which an exemption
is claimed will not defeat the exemption, so long as the incidental uses are
actually in furtherance of a charitable purpose,3 6 unmixed with any other
purposes.37 Thus, there can be no partial exemptions,38 and the fact that
an organization has some charitable purposes or does some charitable activ39
ity is not enough to qualify it for a claimed exemption.
In the instant case, defendant lodges are organized under essentially the
same charters. 40 Each charter reveals that the lodges were formed not only
for charitable and benevolent purposes, but also to cement the bonds of
good fellowship and brotherly love among their members and to practice the
art of Masonry. 4I Although it acknowledged that the Masonic organization
is engaged in many charitable and worthwhile activities, the Supreme Court
34. Id. at 946.
35. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7150, § 22 (Supp. 1972). The wording used
in section 22 indicates that so long as there is no profit motive, a noncharitable use
of the property may still be entitled to the tax exemption, where the property is used
in furthering the charitable purposes for which the exemption is claimed.
36. See Santa Rosa Infirmary v. City of San Antonio, 259 S.W. 926, 931 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1924, jdgmt adopted).
37. Daughters of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 387 S.W.2d 709, 713
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.): "The claimed exempt charity
must be wholly such, it cannot be partially exempt. The property must be used exclusively for charity, unmixed with any other purpose or object." Malone-Hogan
Hosp. Clinic Foundation v. City of Big Spring, 288 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.): "[T]o be a purely public charity its property must be
used exclusively for charitable purposes, free from mixture or combination, and unalloyed with any other purposes or objects." (Citations omitted.)
38. Daughters of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 387 S.W.2d 709, 713
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In holding that the one claiming the exemption must be wholly charitable, the court concluded that there can be
no partial exemptions. Accord, Masonic Temple Ass'n v. Amarillo Ind. School Dist.,
14 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1928, writ ref'd). The court held that the
use of the property to carry on Masonic work was only partly charitable. Therefore,
the exemption was denied.
39. River Oaks Garden Club v. City of Houston, 370 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Tex.
Sup. 1963).
40. Corporate Charters of the Grand Lodge (1900); Charter of the Grand Royal
Arch Chapter of Texas (1900); Charter of the Grand Council of Royal and Select
Masters of Texas (1953); Charter of the Grand Commandery Knights Templar of
Texas (1924).
41. Id. All of the purpose clauses of each defendant lodge are essentially identical.
Therefore, only one is presented here. The Corporate Charters of the Grand Lodge
(1900), provides:
The said Grand Lodge and this corporation is formed for charitable and benevolent
purposes, and to cement bonds of good fellowship and brotherly love among its
members and adherents, and to practice the art of Ancient Free and Accepted
Masonry as has been done from time immemorial.
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of Texas concluded that the defendants' use of the property to conduct meetings, initiations and ceremonies is, in fact, to further the practices of the
Masonic organization and that such activity does not constitute a charitable
purpose.
The Texas Constitution provides the legislature authority to exempt certain
property from taxation; however, if an exemption is provided, it cannot
go beyond established constitutional limitations. 42 For this reason, the court
declared that the legislature had no power under section 22 to exempt the
property of a fraternal organization which was used for furthering a noncharitable purpose. As applied to a fraternal organization's property used
for furthering a noncharitable purpose, the court declared the tax exemption under section 22 to be unconstitutional. The narrowness of the holding
is specifically pointed out in the opinion, that the unconstitutionality of sec4
tion 22 applies only to the type of property involved in this suit. 3
Viewing earlier court decisions, it appears on the surface, that the court
was too harsh in denying the defendant lodges their claimed tax exemption.
In Santa Rosa Infirmary v. City of San Antonio, 44 the Sisters of Charity of the

Incarnate Word claimed that a hospital and the property upon which it was
built were exempt from taxation because they constituted an institution of
purely public charity. The hospital was organized to grant medical assistance to all in need of treatment, regardless of financial status. Only 12
percent of the total number of patients in the hospital were actually charitable,
while the remaining patients paid for the treatment they received. 45 The
money received from the paying patients was the hospital's only profit,46 and it was used solely to pay operating and other hospital expenses,
including the costs of treating the charity patients. In granting the tax ex42. It is specifically provided in the constitution that the legislature can only enact
laws providing for the exemption of property specifically named, and that any law
which attempts to exempt other than the property so named will be null and void.
TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
43. City of Amarillo v. Amarillo Lodge NO. 731, 488 S.W.2d 69, 73 (Tex. Sup.
1972).
44. 259 S.W. 926 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924, jdgmt adopted).
45. Id. at 930:
[D]uring 1919 . . . 2,919 patients were received in the hospital for . . . treatment,
of which 2,590 were full pay patients, 123 part pay patients and 206 were charity
cases ..
With respect to the admission of charity patients no obstacle appears to have
been placed in the way of their reception other than a requirement that statements
of the applicants, or of other trustworthy persons, be furnished at the time of
their admission, to fairly indicate that they were objects of charity and unable to
pay for the services rendered them, and . . . the infirmary was available and open
to those who applied for free treatment.
46. Id. The hospital had other activities; e.g., drug store, which produced income
because paying patients were required to pay for the medicines they received, but the
drug store, for example, operated at a net loss due to the fact that the charity patients
received all of their medicines free of charge. Thus, the income was set-off by the
loss, and no profits were actually made.
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emption, the court pointed out that profits, in a case such as this, would not
defeat the hospital's right to the exemption because all the income received
from the paying patients was appropriated solely to further the charitable
47
purpose for which the hospital was formed.
In contrast, the use of the property in the instant case was to conduct meetings, initiations and ceremonies of the fraternal associations. This did not
constitute a "use in furtherance of a charitable purpose" because the practice of Masonry does not relieve the community or state of any obligation or
duty which they might otherwise have to assume. In Santa Rosa, the fact that
the hospital rendered medical services to some patients free of charge resulted in the discharge of not only a community obligation, but also of a
burden that the community might otherwise have had to assume. Since
the practice of Masonry is not a charitable purpose, it follows naturally that
the use of the property by the defendants is not in furtherance of a charitable purpose.
The Supreme Court of Texas stated: "We do hold that Section 22 of Art.
7150 is unconstitutional as applied to the property involved in this suit.''48
It is evident that the court did not render all applications of section 22 unconstitutional. The property involved in this case was used for noncharitable
activities, and the defendants failed to prove that its use was in furtherance
of a charitable purpose. The property involved in this suit does not come
within the provisions of section 22, and a ruling to that effect would have
been sufficient.
It is apparent that the decision rendered has a twofold application. The
court's determination that the use of the property was neither for a charitable purpose nor in furtherance thereof is, in effect, a message to future litigants that such property as involved in this suit will not be entitled to exemption from taxation. On the other hand, the declaration that section 22 is
unconstitutional as applied to the property in this suit, serves a much different purpose. This declaration informs the legislature that their constitutional authority (to exempt property from taxation) has reached its limit. By
so holding, the Supreme Court of Texas has effectively warned the legislature
against enacting an amendment to section 22 exempting all property of fraternal organizations, and that should they enact such a statute, it will be
49
unconstitutional.
Tommy Mac Gum!ory
47. Id. at 935.
48. City of Amarillo v. Amarillo Lodge NO. 731, 488 S.W.2d 69, 73 (Tex. Sup.
1972) (emphasis added).
49. Prior to the enactment of section 22 in 1967, all suits involving the exemption of fraternal organizations' property which was used for conducting meetings
and other lodge purposes were decided under section 7. In all of those cases, the exemption was denied for one reason or another. City of Houston v. Scottish Rite
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